| | Share of global GDP |
| China’s GDP | 9.4% |
| China’s GDP (PPP basis) | 13.6% |
"The next table lists China’s share of total global demand for a selected list of non-food commodities:
| Non-food commodities | Share of global demand |
| Cement | 53.2% |
| Iron Ore | 47.7% |
| Coal | 46.9% |
| Steel | 45.4% |
| Lead | 44.6% |
| Zinc | 41.3% |
| Aluminum | 40.6% |
| Copper | 38.9% |
| Nickel | 36.3% |
| Oil | 10.3% |
"Finally, the same table for food commodities:
| Food commodities | Share of global demand |
| Pigs | 46.4% |
| Eggs | 37.2% |
| Rice | 28.1% |
| Soybeans | 24.6% |
| Wheat | 16.6% |
| Chickens | 15.6% |
| Cattle | 9.5% |
"What is most noteworthy about these tables, of course, is the disproportion between China’s share of global GDP and China’s commodity consumption."
Pettis, whose commentary is always original and borderline brilliant, goes on to comment about Chinese investment growth and how re-balancing of the economy in that country (from investment-led demand to consumption-led demand), could have significant effects on non-food commodities (second chart):
"Take iron, for example. If Chinese demand declines by 10%, this would represent a reduction in global demand of nearly 5%. I am not an expert in the commodity markets, but I guess that supply and demand considerations are fairly finely balanced, and a 5% reduction in demand should have significant price repercussions – especially if a material part of Chinese demand represents stockpiling and this stockpiling is reversed."
Some food (or non-food) for thought.