Showing posts with label Market. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Market. Show all posts

two years and investment professionals' mindset

Just returned from the CFA Annual Conference in Edinburgh, Scotland this past week and wanted to get a few thoughts down to maybe crystallize my takeaways. If you’d like a play-by-play, the conference was live-tweeted under @CFAIowa and also the #CFA2011 hashtag. I have found myself returning to these feeds and am likely to reference them several more times as I pen this.

The last conference we attended was 2009, and the world was just six months past a blow-up that brought down Lehman, Bear, and (almost) lots of others. The world had undergone a major shift, a ‘phase transition’. That year, it was as if the attendees were in a dark room, grasping around for the light switch. The various speakers proffered various suggestions on the location of the switch, and attendees were still forming their opinions of what exactly had happened and what was likely to transpire in the future. All we knew at the time was that the market had gained about 50% off the bottom in just two months but it was far from clear whether it was sustainable.

In retrospect, as usual, some forecasters were more right than others and the events since make reflecting on it much easier -- had the world collapsed we’d see things much differently today. Instead, equity markets are ahead by double their March 2009 lows and the gains we’ve seen have proven sustainable thus far. In many ways, the light switch has been located.

From the vantage point of 2011, investors seem to have a good grasp of the major (known, large) risks to the world economy. The risks are that are well known today were more or less on the fringe at this time in 2009 – Eurozone economic risks, sovereign credit risks, debt, deficits, over-leveraged consumers, debt-fueled spending, the threat of rising inflation and interest rates, the rise of emerging markets, commodity supply and demand dynamics. Each was more or less reflected to varying degrees in the speeches and seminars this go round. There were a few ‘fringe’ views at the 2011 conference but nothing that was extremely aberrant. (You might have a guy who only likes gold, for example, but even this is almost mainstream today.) Whereas in 2009 the presenters spanned the “31-flavors” gamut, most came in vanilla circa 2011.

I will soon write another post on key takeaways – what might be gleaned from a contrarian viewpoint when 'everybody knows' the risks and issues facing investments. I think there are many broader implications for the investment profession as a whole. It seems clear that the powerful ‘institutional imperative’ will impede future performance even though managers, well aware of the potential headwinds facing market valuations and interest rates, believe they should not be 100% invested right now. Just because the risks are apparent doesn't mean everyone is acting to protect against them. Career risk, or The Risk of Poor Short-Term Performance - a major issue to investment industry credibility - sometimes leads managers do crazy things when viewed from a long-term perspective. Often, 'what's right' is not 'what's right now.'

Until next time!

farmland values and the twenty-seven PE

In Iowa, farmland values are up 25% year-over-year, a boon to the financial health of the state and especially farmers’ net worth, of which farmland comprises the majority. I recently came across a very interesting paper that discussed farmland values. (The creative title “Farmland Values: Current and Future Prospects,” pretty much sums up its contents.) For those interested in more information on the asset class that has been speculated to hold the “next bubble”, it is an enlightening read. I wanted to touch on a few things mentioned in the paper and expound on a few points.

As with all assets, farmland value is derived from the income it generates as well as by the discount rate (opportunity cost of capital) and growth rate assumptions. First, and not surprisingly, current farm income is healthy. Commodity prices are high and cash contribution margins (roughly, profit/revenues) are elevated, increasing farm income and boosting current (and potential) cash rents - what an absentee landowner earns by renting the land for productive use. The discount rate is very low, with ten-year Treasury bonds, the ‘risk-free’(?) benchmark rate), at just 3.4%. I discuss the growth rate assumption more below.

I’ve used price-earnings ratios in past posts, mostly for stocks. They are valid, though, for a variety of assets. Today, stocks trade around 18 times trailing twelve-month earnings. Using the inverse of their interest rate, ten-year Treasuries trade at 29 times ‘earnings’ while farmland is 27 times. The latter two are pretty high numbers. Now, which has shown historically higher growth? The growth rate for corporate (stocks’) earnings tend to track nominal GDP, or about 6%. Bonds don’t grow in value, the yield is mostly fixed as is the payoff at maturity. Farmland, which has lower earnings volatility than stocks and, like them, a (theoretically) infinite life, has tended to grow with the general rise in inflation plus another 2% for productivity improvements (same land, more crop). On a price-earnings ratios alone, it looks like stocks are the best relative deal. Still, cash remains attractive given the below-average projected returns on several asset classes. Cash has the advantage of what I call the “opportunity yield” – the ability to take advantage of cheaper prices when investors revise their return requirements higher.

On the most striking revelations in the piece was that farmland turnover – the percentage of land stock that changes hands in a given year – was lower than its historical average of 3-5%. (Currently, turnover is estimated to be about 1.5% annually.) As we know, the more demand there is for an asset, the greater prices tend to rise. Couple this with a constrained supply of land being ‘offered to the market’ and prices can quickly rise. This is because the whole of the land stock is priced off these marginal, infrequent sales, making the whole appear more valuable on paper. Annually, 98.5% of landowners aren't buying/selling; it's the 1.5% that make the 98.5% a lot of paper wealth. This 'low turnover combined with high demand' phenomenon is also evident in the secondary market trading of several Web 2.0 companies today.

So is the current PE sustainable? As with most investment questions, the answer is nuanced. Farm income can experience sharp corrections when commodity prices sink. This would bring the multiple (land value/farm income) even higher than it is today. In addition, interest rates are very low and have been trending down for most of the last three decades. Should rates rise significantly, investors' opportunity costs rise and the cash rent 'yield' must rise, which means prices must fall. Today, I can't say we're in a bubble. What I can say is that the current expectations baked into the price - continuing high cash rents, low interest rates, and/or good growth rates - might prove to have been overly optimistic when viewed in hindsight.

Farmland is an intensely local market so each parcel is different. Further, prevailing prices are based (as mentioned above) on marginal sales which comprise a very small portion of the total land stock. As long as landowners don't lever up based on current land values to buy still more land, a sharp reduction in land values will not ripple through in the same fashion as the housing 'collapse'. Current evidence suggests those taking on incremental farm debt are mostly larger operators, with younger farmers and livestock producers in the least-optimum financial condition. But anecdotally, I've heard that farmers know two things, 'dirt' (land) and (bank) CDs. The rate on the CDs become their comparison and these folks think, let's buy more land with a 3% cash rent yield if a three-year CD is paying less than 1%. Thinking that way could put more than a few in trouble. So if there are to be detrimental economic impacts in the future should farmland prices come down, the $64B question is how much debt is being underwritten based on current values. Unfortunately, it's probably more than we think.

commodities and inflation protection

It’s clear from the commodity price increases experienced over the past couple years (see this post) and anecdotal evidence -- but not official government numbers -- that inflation has returned and that price increases will be making their way through the economy. Several consumer staples companies have already raised prices 5-7% (P&G, Kimberly-Clark, and Fruit of the Loom, for example). This is just the beginning.

Often, money moves into commodities as an inflation hedge, but do commodities actually protect one's purchasing power after the onset of rising consumer prices? Based on the last time we saw this in the U.S., the answer is "mostly, no". Commodity prices, not surprisingly, tend to lead increases in actual inflation. But once inflation emerges, their ability to purchasing power protection diminishes. Thus, commodity ‘investors’ (aka speculators) who get in near the end of the pricing uptrend do not tend to fare as well.

The above charts illustrate this phenomenon over the same period I discussed in the last two posts, 1964 through 1988. They show commodity prices (Commodity Research Bureau spot price index) rising prior to a major jump in CPI inflation, with the bulk of the price spike clustered into just a couple of years (up 22.1% in 1972 and 59.8% in 1973), while actual annual inflation was just around 4.0%. From 1964 through 1973, average annual inflation was just 2.5% while commodities rose 8.4% per annum. After 1973 and through year-end 1988, annual inflation averaged 7.1% while commodity prices rose just 1.9%. Today’s commodities investors might be disappointed in their future returns while consumers may similarly be displeased with future price increases.

I do not want to be fatalistic and state unequivocally that inflation is inevitable, but I am not optimistic that it can be avoided at this point. The longer commodity prices remain high, the more they lead to higher structural costs for the economy as a whole. Once companies raise prices, they do not tend to lower them. Likewise with wages.

The final chart illustrates commodity prices versus actual inflation since 2000. To me, this looks similar to the period from 1964 through 1974, when commodity prices rose ahead of actual inflation in the face of inflationary government policies (namely, deficit spending). We see similar policies in place today, coupled with unprecedented monetary intervention that isn’t likely to abate anytime soon, especially in the face of a still-stagnant economy. And our national balance sheet is in worse shape. Are the mistakes that led to stagflation in the 1970s being repeated? Unfortunately, it appears so.

stocks and inflation (part 2 of 2)

(This is an update from yesterday's discussion on inflation's effect on markets.)

To augment the information presented in yesterday's post, I wanted to add additional perspective with respect to earnings. Stock prices can be reduced to two components: (1) earnings and (2) a multiple against those earnings. Yesterday's post dealt with the latter without much discussion of the former. So, I've added the chart below to address this oversight.














Readers will note that earnings (dark blue) more than kept pace with inflation over the twenty-five year period from 1964 through 1988. Certainly, if it were possible to invest in corporate earnings alone during this period, an investor would have fared quite well. This is the crux of the argument made by those who believe stocks will keep pace with inflation -- that corporations will raise prices and earnings will largely keep pace. Unfortunately, it's the 'multiple' component that hurts investors during inflation - if ending valuations are meaningfully lower than beginning, an investor may not fare well even if earnings grow nicely. And over this period, they certainly did -- real earnings were 50% higher in 1988 than in 1964.

stocks: inflation hedge or vedge?

I want to spend a little time thinking about what markets do when inflation hits. Common knowledge seems to believe that when inflation rears its ugly head stocks will rise in line with inflation. I think we have seen the monetary stimulus from the Fed show up in financial asset prices lately and I want to dispel this fundamental misconception of stocks as a hedge for high inflation with some market history. Note that my comments are not valid for hyperinflation. Almost anything is better than paper money during such time periods. During Brazil's high inflation of the late 1980s and early 1990s the stock market roughly held its own with domestic paper money (but looked flat to a foreign investor). If you’re like me and believe we’ll see elevated, but not catastrophic inflation in the near future it makes good sense to look at what periods of elevated (again, not hyper-) inflation have done to the stock market.

I looked back at a period of time where inflation was low, rose to quite elevated levels, and fell back again to low average levels. In other words, a period containing three "regimes": before inflation reared its ugly head, during high inflation, and back again to more stable, predictable levels. I chose the twenty-five year period from 1964 through year-end 1988 because it nicely exhibits these characteristics.

The chart to the left shows inflation (consumer price index) in red, the S&P 500 total return in green and the real return (total return minus inflation) in purple. Each is indexed to 100 at 1/1/1964. Clearly, stocks (green) did not keep up with inflation over this time period while the real return on the market over was negative. That’s a pretty poor showing over a period when inflation boosted the consumer price level to almost 4 times its starting point. If stocks were a good inflation hedge we’d expect the green line to be persistently higher than the red, and meaningfully higher at 12/31/1988 if real returns were positive. However, this does not seem to have been the case.

Why were stocks such a poor inflation hedge over this period? The answer lies in valuation. Using Shiller’s cyclically-adjusted PE ratio, which I’ve cited often, the S&P 500 traded at 21.6 times earnings in 1964. By year-end 1988, they were just 14.7, a P/E decline of 32%. The chart below shows the inverse relationship between inflation (red) and stock valuations (cyclically-adjusted PE, green). Over this time period, the correlation between the two was negative 0.956, representing an almost perfect inverse correlation. High inflation proved to be an enemy when stock valuations started high.


Why is inflation so hostile for stock valuations? It comes down to interest rates; nominal interest rates must include compensation for inflation plus a real return component. Investors ultimately compare this rate against the "coupon" available on stocks - that is, corporate returns on equity (ROE). Since ROE does not tend to fluctuate much over long periods and is more likely to fall than rise during high inflation, the yield available on stocks can only change if their prices move lower (coupon "yield" relative to book value moves higher). Maturities are also compared – bonds have a definite maturity while a stock’s maturity is infinite. I’ll defer to Warren Buffett for further clarification: “Because of the additional risk, the natural reaction of investors is to expect an equity return that is comfortably above the bond return – and 12 percent return on equity versus, say, 10 percent return on bonds issued by the same corporate universe does not seem to qualify as comfortable. As the spread narrows, equity investors start looking for the exits.”

Historical stock returns are likely to have looked much different if starting valuations were much lower than the 22 PE we see in the above illustrations. Because of these elevated levels, inflation had a demonstrably large impact on longer-term returns. While starting valuations always matter for subsequent returns, they seem to matter even more during high inflation.

Could this happen again? Well, today the cyclically-adjusted PE ratio is 23.7, so valuations are even higher than where these charts begin (1964). Even if you believe the Fed has everything under control and we won’t see high inflation anytime soon, it’s worthwhile to consider the aforementioned data when allocating your portfolio. The importance of stable prices is most noticeable when they go missing.

earnings guidance not as extensive

Since I started investing I've always shaken my head at the quarterly guidance game, which seems to be played extensively. (Who cares if you the mid-point of your own guidance (which analysts home in on as their point estimate) by a penny?) Of course, it's always been concentrated among larger companies and these are disproportionately mentioned on CNBC. Speaking of CNBC, Herb Greenberg has some interesting statistics here that elucidates just how extensive (or not) this practice is.

complacency built, and building

Yesterday, the NYSE saw 365 new 52-week highs and just 9 new lows.

How much longer can this relentless, low volatility run continue? Since the end of September, we have seen only six days where the market has declined by 1% or more (just two of those this year). And the last time the market declined 2% or more was on August 11th -- and it's happened only twice since the end of June last year! That's a long time to go without substantial downside volatility.

Now, it's one thing to see the market climbing but we must consider its context. To do that we juxtapose this against prevailing valuations. On that front, it’s not encouraging. The S&P 500 stands at 18.5x earnings (over 24 cyclically adjusted) and is discounting decade-ahead per annum returns under 5% (1.8% of which is from dividends). Sure, interest rates are low which means stock *should be* worth more, but I don't buy it because investors can revise their return expectations relatively easily (and quickly).

So volatility is low and valuations are elevated, but the market keeps going up?

"It feels safer."

"There is money to be made."

Low volatility to the investor, to borrow from N.N. Taleb, is like the farmer feeding the soon-to-be-Thanksgiving-dinner turkey. Just as the safety appears greatest (based on backward-looking data), the danger is actually at its highest.

private market froth-iness

While it's not clear there is a bubble yet, some of the private market valuations I've seen are bubble-icious. My evidence is more anecdotal since I'm not an "on the ground" venture capitalist. But here is something from Fred Wilson, offering a good overview from a very credible source that there is a froth in the private markets. Money is sloshing around the bathtub, and I'd argue it's spilling over into all asset classes.

Remember W.B.: "The first rule of investing: Don't lose money. The second rule: Don't forget Rule #1." Remember the downside, grasshopper.

quick market snapshot, new highs/lows

Yesterday's trading:

NYSE:
New Highs: 375
New Lows: 2

Nasdaq:
New Highs: 296
New Lows: 5

Juxtaposed against prevailing market valuations, it's telling to see new highs outnumbering new lows by such a wide margin.

title for a 2011 year-end entry

Another year has passed, while a new one begins. Each annual turn is often a time of reflection as well as prediction. In keeping with that tradition, today’s entry will comprise some of the former, but mostly the latter, and some of neither.

The S&P 500 ends the year up about 15%, the Nasdaq about 17% and the Dow 11%. From where I stand, that’s a banner year, especially considering that average annual returns are more like 8-9% and long-term expected returns from today’s levels look to be under 6%. (Thus we can say this one year’s returns represent two years' expected.) Commodities and other risky assets also had a great year. Bonds and stocks, both foreign and domestic, performed well. Commodities, in some cases, knocked it out of the park (think cotton, up 90%). Gold rose about 30%, oil 13%. Housing prices did not do so well, however, and the economy limped along.

So 2010 looked good for the markets. Does that have any relation to a 2011? As we have to disclose often, past performance is not necessarily an indicator of future results. Still, the two are often related. Specifically, past performance can be a contrary indicator of future results. As the saying goes, if something can’t continue, it won’t. I am optimistic about the future overall, but I see several areas that appear stretched and where future results may not be as robust as the recent past.

Today we learned that that Groupon accepted about $500 million of a $1 billion funding round. This is a two-year old company is an industry that doesn’t have a lot of barriers to entry. Sure, they were the first, but their margins are artificially high and their labor-intensive strategy depends a lot on street-level salespeople. There is a lot of panache here; Groupon is cool and retailers want to be associated with them - now. But “cool” is ephemeral and in business competition does not lay down just because you're bigger. Especially when the business model is so easily copied and the space nascent. Competitor LivingSocial has received investment from Amazon and it’s not a stretch to believe my favorite online retailer could move into that market. Yet Groupon is raising a billion dollars. To me, it’s unbelievable and is probably a sign of too-heady times in the private markets.

Meanwhile, the commodities rose still has its bloom on the ever-present investment thesis of increasing consumerism in emerging markets. I think there could be several surprises on the “emerging” front in the new year that will surprise a lot of the gung-ho investors in this space. I speak specifically about gold and rare-earth metals here, but I get the feeling that a lot of the agricultural commodities have run up too high (and so have some of the ag-related stocks). A thesis that makes sense at a price does not make sense at any price.

Oil seems fairly priced to me at present.

As for stocks, a previous post pretty well elucidates my thoughts here. Bonds are something I’ve also recently written at length about and my feelings here haven’t changed a whole lot. I think surprises to the downside on bonds and stocks await. Put premiums are low as markets near their recent highs amid high levels of investor bullishness. This tends to be the case near market peaks.

Are there any bubbles (other than in the use of the word “bubble”)? I think there is one in concerns over our fiscal and monetary situation. That is a funny thing to say because I, too, am concerned. It just seems to me that “everyone” is concerned about these two things and so they are probably somewhat overblown. Such things have a way of working themselves out. While it’s often felt that the good folks in Washington live in a different world, I’m not convinced they won’t take care of these problems. A year ago, I wouldn’t have dreamed Obama would break his campaign promises by passing a law that was largely deferential to Republicans. But it doesn’t take much to change Washington’s mind and/or direction these days and our problems will not just get worse in a linear fashion. However, fiscal and monetary issues should lead investors to plan for contingencies, protecting from downside deviation.

The solutions aren’t linear, either. Think protection from phase transitions, or more popularly, tipping points. Securities trading below intrinsic value. Healthy balance sheets. Excess cash. Opportunistic management teams with flexible operating philosophies. Don’t try and time the market, but be ready to pounce when Mr. Market turns manic.

Most of the economic data coming out is noisy. The bottom line is the economy isn't going gangbusters and I'd expect that activity would remain at a similar pace. Of course, that's the easiest expectation. Unemployment just can't come down as fast as we'd all like without some significant retraining and job creation in other sectors. It’s a structural issue which will take years to resolve. At the same time, corporate profit margins are well above their historic highs.

2010 was a fantastic year, personally as well as professionally. Each day is a chance to learn something new and I'd like to think I was able to do so. I hope 2011, despite its being an odd year, holds similar promise. Happy New Year.

the stock market ahead

In 2011, I don't think the stock market deserves to rally. Now, that doesn’t mean it won’t. (To be any good at making predictions, I must hedge.)

I see a few things. Abundant in the media are calls for stocks to rise and bonds to fall, with stocks being cheap. But why can’t stocks and bonds be expensive concurrently? Money will move out of bonds, so the story goes, and into stocks, making one less expensive and the other moreso. (One of my) problem(s) with this is that money flows don’t really tell the story. The stock market is simply trading of already-offered shares held by others. The company is not involved (excluding share buybacks and recaps). When A sells his shares he must sell to B, who pays money to A. B then owns shares and A holds cash. As John Hussman has pointed out, the fact that A brings his cash into the market doesn't make prices go up, since no cash has actually been added to the market. Instead of A holding shares, B holds them. The same amount of cash is “on the sidelines.” It is the eagerness of the buyer (or seller) that makes prices fluctuate, as stock prices are priced on the marginal trade. Okay, that was a little long to make the point but I think it was necessary.

When I look at stocks broadly speaking (S&P 500 Index) today, I see a market that discounts decade-ahead total returns of just under 6% over the next decade. Since returns tend to be more stable when predicting for longer periods of time, I am most comfortable with this 6%-for-the-decade number. But I’ll list a few others. Five year: 4.5%. Three year: 1.6%. One year: -8.9%.

(A couple things to note here: these numbers are based on my calculation of the intrinsic value of the market and include the current S&P 500 dividend yield of 1.89%. Intrinsic value is based on normal earnings, which use numbers representing long-term averages for earnings growth rates, returns on equity and cost of capital.)

What these numbers tells me is that over a decade returns might end up decent, but not spectacular given the potential drawdowns inherent to stock markets. And it also says if your time horizon is shorter than five years, return prospects don’t look to spectacular (negative on a price-change basis for one- and three-year periods). To use a holiday metaphor, these returns look like a fruit cake. I'd rather have sugar cookies.

It’s always best to judge each asset class relative to the cafeteria menu of available investment options. On that front, bonds don’t look much better. A ten-year Treasury yields 3.3% today, not spectacular and especially with a duration close to 7 certainly not worth a large risk, again, on a risk-adjusted basis. Shorter-term bonds seem the best place to reduce risks in this space - the most salient of which appears to be reinvestment risk. Too, interesting opportunities are emerging in municipal bonds. I may expound on this later.

Average Returns are Expected with Stocks at Fair Value

The capital markets and the economy are related, but exhibit disparate behavior. The U.S. economy has not been performing well since March, but that hasn’t stopped the stock market from rallying nearly 60% from the lows. The market rally has not been limited to stocks. Indeed, risk aversion has meaningfully subsided across the capital markets; the least creditworthy stocks and bonds have led the charge higher. High yield bonds are up nearly 50% this year, more than double the S&P 500. These risky bonds now yield less than 8%, close to where very low risk (AA) bond yields peaked early this year. Triple-C bonds, which are “currently vulnerable and dependent on economic conditions to meet [their] commitments,” are up 92% for the year. It appears to us that from current capital market valuations, further (durable) price appreciation will require fundamental economic improvement.

We never know where the markets will move next, but we can make reasonable estimates of their intrinsic value. According to our estimates, the S&P 500 trades at 16 times normal earnings and near the high end of its value range. Using cyclically adjusted earnings for the S&P 500, stocks trade at closer to 20 times. (The price-earnings ratio for the market has averaged roughly 15 over very long periods.) Another measure of market valuation which focuses on the replacement value of assets, is over 0.80, just slightly above the long-term average of roughly 0.75. One measure taken alone may not indicate much, but several arrows pointing in the same direction demand more attention. And on many different measures, the domestic stock market in aggregate is no longer cheap but fairly valued.


Ultimately, investors should be rewarded for providing capital to those who use it. But contrary to popular belief, risk and return do not always follow a linear relationship; that is, high risk does not necessarily equate to a high return. Today, the capital markets appear much riskier than just a few months ago (at lower prices) and implied long-term future capital market returns appear to be merely average from today’s levels. What that means for the near-term direction of markets is anyone’s guess.

Gold and Forex, Sitting in a Tree...

There seems to be something dangerous brewing in gold and in foreign exchange markets, at least as it pertains to individuals trading this stuff themselves and betting big. It is now far too easy to “play” in both areas and many of those venturing in now may be setting themselves up to be burned. The foreign exchange market is the world’s biggest casino, where leverage magnifies gains and losses to the point where fortunes can be (and are) won and lost in a matter of seconds. The dollar has been moving lower with remarkable consistency, lulling some to believe in a "can't lose" trend. Danger, Will Robinson.

Gold, on the other hand, strikes me as incredibly bid up, and there are no shortage of brokers there to help (exploit) the individuals scrambling to buy gold. Something tells me when the people facilitating the transactions make more than the investors, there is some froth in this market. While leverage is not inherent to this market as it is with forex, today's "investors" strike me more as the final group in a giant Ponzi scheme. It all comes down to price. Note that investors at the gold's height in the early 80s need a $2,000+ gold price to merely break even on their purchases almost 30 years ago.

Television and radio are now replete with advertisements for gold buying services and forex trading. Some caution is warranted in these areas; I would expect surprises to be the rule rather than the exception as we move forward. Reversion to the mean can be powerful.

Is the Future Any Less 'Uncertain' Now?

It may not be the time to exuberant just yet.

The winds of popular sentiment appear to be blowing in one direction with respect to the economy – that is, that the economy is stabilizing and things are looking up. We should see stabilization in the latter half of this year and positive economic growth in the first quarter of next year, we hear. True? Perhaps. I will not make those sorts of predictions because I just do not know (and I know it).

The S&P 500 has rallied about 40% off its early March lows. Emerging market stocks are up close to 70% from their March lows and up 42% for the year, versus an S&P 500 that was up about 5% through yesterday. The CBOE volatility index – VIX – which some call the “fear index” is lower than we saw back in September of last year, prior to the collapse of Lehman and the “economic Pearl Harbor,” as Warren Buffett so eloquently says. Granted, the markets are still about 40% below their highs, indicating another 66% gain needed to get back to even. But they have come up pretty far and fast, and the headwinds to corporate earnings mean stocks’ values have fallen since the highs (and record profit margins) of 2007.

As I laid out at the beginning of the year, our economy is not likely to be the same coming out of this crisis. Consumers are not likely to resume their spendthrift ways going forward. Rather, we’ll probably continue to see higher savings rates and years of deleveraging as consumers align their household cost structures to their income levels. This will probably mean smaller homes and less conspicuous consumption. Accordingly, the source of 70%+ of our economic activity (consumer spending) is likely to be much less robust and become a smaller part of the economy. Capacity utilization will probably be sub-optimal for some time, which means higher structural unemployment and lower wage growth (if not wage rate stagnation). If the government continues its profligate spending without commensurate cuts in entitlements (which it’s actually adding), we will not be able to avoid higher taxes down the road. My personal bias tells me higher taxes are likely because tough decisions on public pensions, Social Security, and Medicare/Medicaid, while probably salable to the public by the popular administration, are not as much fun as tackling health care reform and “green” energy. When the public is willing to suspend disbelief, we get trouble.

The various feedback loops created by all of these elements should result in lower levels of economic growth. Also, corporate returns on equity are likely to be lower and cost of capital higher, meaning price-earnings multiples on stocks might end up structurally lower. Remember, stocks trended strongly upward from 1982 to (roughly) 2007 because of a secular decline in interest rates. We saw interest rates come down from nearly 20% to nearly 0% today. Earnings multiples went from 8 to 20, a roughly 4% annual return solely from multiple expansion. Unfortunately, interest rates are at zero today and a rising interest rate environment is bad for stocks. Look at the market from the early 1940s through the late 1960s – a steady trending market marked by rising P/E multiples and robust corporate earnings growth. From there, the market went nowhere until the early 1980s, paving the way for another strongly upward-trending market. One can argue all they want, but the starting level of valuations plays a major role in long-term stock returns. Judging from this perspective, we clearly lack such tailwinds from where we stand today.

Governments, businesses and consumers do not become aware of all these realities overnight. They take time. It took years for people to go from saving 8-10% of their income (1950s through early 1990s) to 0% (2006), and to double their household debt as a percentage of income. The same goes for businesses and governments (which are run by consumers), who largely didn’t have a “rainy day” contingency plan going into this crisis. I think this is bound to change as we go forward. The result will be a more resilient economy but one that is less optimized should boundless growth and low volatility return.

The market appears fairly valued from both a bottom up and top down standpoint, assuming long-term normal profit margins. That’s not to say it won’t go higher or lower. But from what I’m seeing from a bottom up standpoint, the tremendous bargains we saw in the first quarter of the year are few and far between. Prices at current levels appear to offer only average long-term future return prospects. Yet those willing to dig can find select opportunities available in multiple asset classes.

The Road to 2010 goes through 2009

Another year has come to a close, and another is beginning. And what a year 2008 was. 2009 will prove to be just as interesting, punctuated by more business failures amid bad economic data (and maybe even some good news). Just how bad it can get is anyone’s guess; how good it can get isn’t really on anyone’s mind at this point.

As an investor today it is more important than ever to have a macro viewpoint. For many years, it simply wasn’t necessary because the range of economic fluctuations was pretty narrow. Stability brought investors comfort and, according to popular thought, it was more or less safe to “buy on dips,” because the market would almost inevitably ratchet higher in ensuing years. Downturns were short-lived as the Fed took an aggressive stance, pumping in liquidity, but increasing the moral hazard a bit more each time. Slowly, risk aversion subsided. Investors began paying more for earnings and demanded less interest spread over Treasuries to compensate for the additional risk. Much of the returns of the past 25 years have been driven by investors’ willingness to pay higher multiples on earnings. Going back farther, though – over 100 years –stocks are up less than 5% annually, which happens to be the rate of earnings growth over that time. The rest of the roughly 9% compounded return has come from dividends, which will be back in vogue. (Some companies whose dividends may otherwise be sustainable may still have to temporarily curtail them in the current downturn, even stalwart companies.)

Fast forward to this year. We seen a broad based decline in the stock market, the first such major decline since the early 1980s. (The decline in 2001-2002 was really concentrated in a few sectors – media, telecom, and technology – and thus did not affect all sectors equally.) The market went into the year disjointed – with financials down considerably but energy, materials and industrials still holding up relatively well. Now, the market is no longer quite as disjointed, though the degree of undervaluation in the market is far from homogenous.

The most concerning issues are twofold: confidence and cost of capital. Yes, there are others, but I want to concentrate on these broad themes. Confidence underpins our whole economic system, especially with respect to its lubricant, credit. And confidence has been lost. To use a crude example, when your best friend sleeps with your significant other, it’s going to take a long time to trust either of them again. And I think that’s the case here. Trust is built up over a long period of time as confidence builds that the future will largely resemble the past. Trust in, for instance, underwriting standards, was built up over a long period of time as default rates remained low and leverage ratios were allowed to ratchet higher. The loans made late in the cycle kept it going for longer than would have normally been sustained because of the “Ponzi finance” nature of the activity. That is, new loans were used to pay interest and principal on the old loans. As long as credit was available and lenders were willing to suspend disbelief, this worked fine. Until it didn’t.

We’re going to get back to system that relies on the character of the borrower rather than purely (unreliable) quantitative measures. I’m not sure how exactly this will work, because financial innovations will remain a fact of life. But I know it will mean banks and other finance companies will retain a larger portion of their securitizations and/or provide stronger guarantees to security holders. Business models will evolve (with the help of what is likely to be heavy-handed regulation). Formerly profitable businesses will cease to be so, and the seeds of future banking problems will be planted.

The economy is a non-equilibrium, evolutionary system where feedback loops play a meaningful role. George Soros calls this “reflexivity.” The cost of capital across the system has risen quite suddenly, not just debt financing, where rates are obviously much higher and capital less available, but equity. What isn’t often considered is that higher stock prices (along with lower interest rates) bring down the cost of capital. And cost of capital has been falling since the early 1980s, which has been a tremendous tailwind for the values of financial assets. Consider the feedback loop here. At a lower cost of capital, there are more potential projects for companies to undertake. For instance, if cost of capital is 6%, projects with a return potential greater than 6% will add economic value. Adding economic value feeds back into higher stock prices, which decreases the cost of capital, and the cycle continues. And undertaking more projects means more capital spending, which feeds back into economic growth in a meaningful way and further lowers the cost of capital. But when cost of capital goes to 10% or 12% for an extended period, old projects will run off and newer ones will be made under more restrictive conditions. That is, projects with return potential higher than 10% or 12% are now needed to add economic value. (Most) companies would not undertake an 8% return project while paying a 10% capital cost since to do so would be value destroying. With the long-run average return on equity at 12-13%, there are far fewer projects when the hurdle rate is 10% than when it is 6%. Less economic value added means lower stock prices, which leads to a higher cost of capital, and the cycle continues. The longer stock prices stay low, the more likely it is we’ll be in a feedback loop that will look very different from the past 25 years.

Furthermore, when cost of capital is higher, the justified P/E ratio on stocks is lower. We’ve lived in a 15-20 P/E market for the past 20 years largely on the basis of lower cost of capital as interest rates have generally been declining and remained low over this period. The cash tax rate and growth rate do not vary much over time. Returns on capital have moved higher, too, but at least partially have been driven by the levering up, through debt, of the country. So as capital costs rise and the feedback mechanism kicks in, justified P/Es, in my view, will be much lower than we’ve been used to.

What does this mean for investors? Active management is going to be very important. Index fund investors are going to be more challenged. This last year should have proven, once again, that the efficient market hypothesis, beta, alpha, the capital asset pricing model, etc., are all garbage. Markets follow power laws, not normal distributions. Markets are open, complex adaptive systems, not closed equilibrium systems. Returns to the stock market are path dependent. They exhibit oscillations and experience periods of punctuated equilibrium that come about largely through endogenous factors that may or may not have exogenous shocks as the initial cause. Small changes can have big impacts (and do). It is not completely different this time, but it will be different for a while and investors must recalibrate their expectations for how stocks behave. We are likely to see a market, akin to the 1970s, that moves in a trading range over time. (Actually, we’ve already seen it – from 2000 forward.) Income from dividends will be more important in this kind of environment. Being willing to buy at high free cash flow yields and sell at lower free cash flow yields and being willing to hold cash at times will be key. If we get back to a market that forgets what has happened over the past year and resumes trading at its 15-18 multiple consistently, I would be very surprised. But I have been wrong in the past and will be wrong again.


Either way, it will be an interesting year, and I will make no explicit predictions regarding the markets. The economy is bound to get worse in the year ahead and geopolitical concerns will become more serious (for instance, a few countries may defect from the Euro currency), but asset prices will turn up well ahead of a recovery in the real economy.

Time to be Aggressive?

The U.S. stock market capitalization is now just 65% of GDP, and stocks are trading around 10 times normal earnings. That is, stocks’ earnings yield is 10%. The current dividend yield is 3.6%, higher than the 3.2% on the ten-year Treasury note. On an absolute basis, the last time we saw these prices on the S&P 500 Index was in April 1997. But to find these valuation levels, one would have to go back to the mid-1980s. Yes, the economy is weakening significantly and will be very difficult for quite some time. And stock prices will probably still go lower, perhaps meaningfully so. But stocks are discounting a very difficult economic scenario already, and investors at current levels should do very, very well from here. As Warren Buffett recently wrote, "If you wait for the robins, spring will be over."

The State of the Stock Market

On the New York Stock Exchange:

New 52-week highs: 13

New 52-week lows: 1,813

Of the 52-week highs, 12 of them are Inverse funds. Take from this what you will.

Indiscriminate Selling Continues to Bring Expected Returns Higher

The world sure seems bleak right now. At least that's what the media is intent on conveying, as it produces an almost endless stream of bad news – home prices falling, food and gas prices rising out of control, stocks (and 401k balances) down significantly amid an uncertain and fragile economic situation. What is lost in the noise, however, is that our economy is in good fundamental shape. Because most people still have jobs, they largely continue to pay their mortgages despite fears of widespread defaults. True, some areas have been hit especially hard by problems in the housing market. But this is not the entire country! The average consumer is pretty well leveraged, and may realize that ratcheting back spending is a good idea, even though it may be painful to do so. Consumers ratcheting back their spending will affect the unemployment rate as the most discretionary items are cut from household budgets (especially as more people start to budget). Yet the situation we're seeing now is not really anything new.

While the widespread problems in the housing market are a relatively new phenomenon, it is just a different version of problems we have experienced in the past. This time it is the real estate market, last time it was Internet stocks, in the early 1980s with was runaway inflation. All brought stock prices down to levels that would, years later, look like a bargain. It is my contention that this time is no different. Like a B movie, the specifics may have changed, but the basic story is about the same.

What we won’t hear much about is the incredible opportunities available to investors right now. Home prices are lower, yes. But for those with available purchasing power, very good income-producing real estate is available at lower and lower prices. Cap rates (the assumed rate of return on property based on net operating income) are rising across the country as many of the former sources of financing with loose lending terms have shut down. Stock prices are now more than 20% below their highs of last year. Many of the world’s finest companies are selling at low multiples to long-term free cash flows. The time to invest new money is now. Asset prices may continue to get cheaper in the short-to-intermediate term, but those who have the courage of their convictions and invest now might just look like geniuses five years hence.

Amid all the uncertainty, what can we expect the stock market to look like in 10 years? I ran a few numbers, assuming different scenarios (none of which might illustrate what will actually happen, mind you) but using the same basic underlying idea. I’m assuming that earnings in the future continue to grow at about 6%, or the long-term trend rate. I then made separate lines of assumptions – that ending price-to-earnings ratios are 15, 20, and 25 ten years from now. Given these assumptions, what can we expect for returns from current market levels? The table below illustrates.


If P/Es stay about where they are, or 20 times earnings, we might expect annual returns of around 10% annually including dividends. If P/Es decline to 15, this number drops to 7.5%. At 25, we can expect annual returns of 13%, but when stocks have hit a P/E of 25 they have usually not stayed there for long. In addition to the above, I made another assumption not listed on the chart; that is an ending P/E of 10. In this scenario, stocks should return only a cumulative 10.9% over ten years, or 1% compounded annually, for a total return of 3.3% annually from current market levels. The only way I see us getting to a P/E of 10 is in a highly inflationary environment like the early 80s and/or one where the economy is stagnant. Which scenario ends up being close to the actual result is anyone's guess.

Lower valuations generate higher future returns despite the short term pain. The table below illustrates what these same numbers would have looked like from the highs of October 2007, when the S&P closed at 1,565.


The difference is striking. Falling stocks prices have added about a cumulative 34% (3% annually) to the possible ten year returns from stocks. That is, a person investing now stands to earn an incremental 3% annually versus another person investing at the October highs - regardless of what the market does over the next ten years!



Over the long-term, stocks track earnings. The above chart show the last twenty years (1998-2008) of actual earnings, normal, or trend, earnings, and stock prices. The normal earnings line is the trend line, because it assumes earnings grow 6% annually without any volatility. The actual S&P earnings per share has tracked this line over time, and although it has diverged meaningfully at points, it has always seemed to tend back to it after diverging. Stock prices also track this trend, excluding the irrationally exuberant period of the late 1990s. Betting on stocks is a bet on future earnings. So if you believe that over the longer-term our economy will perform about as it has in the past, stock appear to offer reasonable returns from these levels. But these levels also appear to offer excellent opportunities to buy individual stocks that will perform significantly better than the overall market in the years to come.

Credit Problems in Perspective

With all of today’s seemingly dire newspaper headlines, sometimes it is difficult to keep things in perspective. Consider, for instance, the current “credit crunch,” including mortgage-related write-downs and credit losses and their effect on financial institutions globally. Through April 1, over 45 of the world’s biggest banks and securities brokerage firms have announced a total of over $230 billion in asset write-downs and credit losses, according to Bloomberg.

This is certainly a very large number, but let's view it in context. It is just 0.4% of the $57.7 trillion U.S. household net worth and less than 2% of our annual gross domestic product. In addition, only $26 billion of this is actual realized losses. In other words, over $200 billion has been due to valuation changes in the securities, whose underlying assumptions may or may not accurately reflect the eventual economic reality that will transpire. If losses actually turn out to be less than is implied by these valuations, we could see “write-ups” and/or higher returns on equity in future periods (owing to the smaller capital base caused by asset-writedowns) . But, of course, losses could also be larger than expected...

2008: A Disjointed Market

As I did last year, I wanted to set forth my views on the markets as we head into a new year. Again, I offer the caveat that predictions, in general, are worthless. The future is necessarily unpredictable. This doesn’t stop people from predicting that, for instance, the S&P 500 will end the year at 1,650 or that oil will top $150. I take a more measured approach, preferring to indicate ranges of possibilities rather than precise estimates. Note that I don’t trade based solely on these macro viewpoints, as I prefer to concentrate on individual names.

Let’s first consider what I said last year: I said I liked two of the Dow’s worst 2006 performers, a statement which is still true (though there are much better bargains out there than these). In fact, I like them even more than last year (since they're cheaper), as Home Depot (HD)was the Dow’s second-largest decliner [after Citigroup (C)]. Wal-Mart (WMT) stayed about where it was at the end of 2006, but business value grew more than its stock price. I said domestic markets may do better than developed international markets. This was partially right: the MSCI EAFE was up 11.2% on the year in dollar terms, but only 3.5% in local currency terms. The S&P 500’s 5.5% gain bested the EAFE’s apples-to-apples return. But the dollar continued to decline (and help international investor returns) while I expected it to rise.


I still believe the dollar is due to rise. On a purchasing power parity basis against major currencies, the dollar is probably 10-30% undervalued. Of course, over long periods currency fluctuations even out, but the dollar has added to returns substantially over the past five years, and I don’t think that trend should be extrapolated too far into the future. Add that to the popular sentiment against the dollar – virtually all of it negative. Add also that a to-remain-nameless supermodel announced publicly that she no longer wants to be paid in dollars. When the least knowledgeable person or group appears, through the lens of popular sentiment, to be making a brilliant decision, it may be time to take a fresh look at the alternate scenario. I now believe it prudent to hedge back to the dollar, if possible. Several very good mutual funds, recently reopened, hedge their currency exposure.

Where is the stock market today? The spread between the forward earnings yield on stocks and the yield on 10-year Treasuries is about 1.6% at today’s levels. As I’ve mentioned in a previous post, this spread has averaged 0.4% but has varied between –4% and +7% over that time period as well. At this point, I would rather have my money in stocks than in Treasuries.

The worst performing sectors in 2007, Financials (down 20.8%) and Consumer Discretionary (down 14.3%), look to be the leaders over the next few years. Financial stocks look the cheapest and thus the most likely to rise from current levels. In addition, many of these stocks trade below book or at historically low premiums to book. Several consumer discretionary stocks, this year’s second-worst performing sector in the S&P 500, also look to be better performers in the year-ahead. Homebuilders may have a little farther to fall, but the risk-reward tradeoff is very favorable from here. I looked at one homebuilder recently that is generating a 25% free cash flow yield. Several REITs have been caught in the "financials" mess and now trade below book value while paying hefty dividends. I look to the beaten-down areas for future standout performers. I am choosing to stay away from some of the Nasdaq's best performers such as Amazon (AMZN), Apple (AAPL), and Research in Motion (RIMM), which were up 139%, and 137% and 165%, respectively, in 2007. These stocks seem too popular to be cheap.

Utilities are probably priced too expensively for their fundamentals. Consider that the utilities sector has risen 121% in the past five years and is the second best performing sector in the S&P 500 over that period, after Energy, which is up 230% over that same timeframe. Consumer Discretionary, Health Care, and Financials, by contrast, are the worst performing, up 42%, 33%, and 32%, respectively, over the past five years. Continuing to bet on Energy, Utilities, and Materials seems to me to be more a bet on hope than on fundamentals. I could be wrong, but it is not within my circle of competence to project from where such high future returns will come.

The market, for the first time in a couple years, is quite disjointed. In 2004, 2005, 2006, the worst performing and top-performing sector were all positive and the spread between best and worst was between 34% and 16%. We had a pretty homogenous, steady march upward. In 2007 that changed, as the spread between the best performing (Energy) and worst performing (Financials) was 53%, with Energy up 32% and Financials down 21%. In such disjointed markets, it is likely that the best performing are expensive, the worst performing are cheap, or both (think technology in 1998-2000). In this case, I’d much rather dive into very cheap financials than ride energy and materials stocks on the hope that commodity prices continue to rise.

I, nor anyone else, can know for sure if a recession is coming. To be honest, I wouldn’t be surprised if one is already here, a feeling I get after reading third quarter earnings reports and listening to company conference calls. Jobs data, as a lagging indicator, has not yet declined to reflect this, and unemployment is still at a level many consider “full.” Two sectors – financials and consumer discretionary – probably already reflect recessionary conditions and thus stocks in these sectors should be hurt less by an actual downturn. The sectors that will really be hurt by a recession are precisely 2007’s winners – energy, materials, utilities and industrials. While utility companies will be okay, their stocks look to be pricing in uninterrupted, strong global growth.

In 2006, oil prices were essentially flat. This year they rose almost 30%. I think in 2008 we’ll average the year at a lower price that where we began. This is especially true if the worldwide economy really slows down. I don’t have any special insight into the marginal cost of production of a barrel of oil, but some very credible sources lead me to believe it’s now over $50 but under $70 per barrel (which is quite a bit higher than I thought last year). So somewhere in that range doesn’t seem like a bad place to consider as a fair price for oil. Regardless of the oil price fluctuations, I would like to see some of these oil companies trading at a 6 times earnings like we saw in mid-2006 again in 2008. But we’ll have to see if I get my wish.

What I am worried about is inflation and a lot of others are too (gold was up substantially in 2007, as were TIPS). Nevertheless, I think is healthy to worry about it because it is an ever-present threat to wealth. From what I’ve read, inflation (as measured by the CPI) if calculated the old way, would be substantially higher than at present (8-10% versus just 2-4%). This is not hard to believe. I see higher prices or similar prices but smaller packages (stealth inflation) almost everywhere I shop. Food price inflation is rampant in fast-growing countries like China and in the U.S.. I’m sure the artificial (read: subsidies necessary to survive) market for ethanol is playing a role here. I must note that deflation continues in certain areas, such as consumer electronics. Why worry about inflation? Higher (especially higher than expected) inflation means higher interest rates which leads to higher bond yields (lower prices) and may hurt stock market values. Companies with pricing power will be the best positioned. Also, real estate values tend to rise with inflation though it pays to be selective here.

Well, I’m sure I could write several more paragraphs on what I’m currently thinking but I’ll cut it off here. These are some overarching views on the year ahead. As usual, it is bound to be interesting. If your investments get cheaper and nothing fundamental has changed, buy more! Be greedy when others are fearful and fearful when others are greedy. Happy investing in 2008.

Disclosure: Long shares of C, HD, WMT.