We discuss a broad range of issues that are often investment-related, but not always so. We call it a 'thought blog'. Sagacious: Having or showing keen discernment, sound judgment, and farsightedness.
commodities and inflation protection
Often, money moves into commodities as an inflation hedge, but do commodities actually protect one's purchasing power after the onset of rising consumer prices? Based on the last time we saw this in the U.S., the answer is "mostly, no". Commodity prices, not surprisingly, tend to lead increases in actual inflation. But once inflation emerges, their ability to purchasing power protection diminishes. Thus, commodity ‘investors’ (aka speculators) who get in near the end of the pricing uptrend do not tend to fare as well.


The above charts illustrate this phenomenon over the same period I discussed in the last two posts, 1964 through 1988. They show commodity prices (Commodity Research Bureau spot price index) rising prior to a major jump in CPI inflation, with the bulk of the price spike clustered into just a couple of years (up 22.1% in 1972 and 59.8% in 1973), while actual annual inflation was just around 4.0%. From 1964 through 1973, average annual inflation was just 2.5% while commodities rose 8.4% per annum. After 1973 and through year-end 1988, annual inflation averaged 7.1% while commodity prices rose just 1.9%. Today’s commodities investors might be disappointed in their future returns while consumers may similarly be displeased with future price increases.
I do not want to be fatalistic and state unequivocally that inflation is inevitable, but I am not optimistic that it can be avoided at this point. The longer commodity prices remain high, the more they lead to higher structural costs for the economy as a whole. Once companies raise prices, they do not tend to lower them. Likewise with wages.

The final chart illustrates commodity prices versus actual inflation since 2000. To me, this looks similar to the period from 1964 through 1974, when commodity prices rose ahead of actual inflation in the face of inflationary government policies (namely, deficit spending). We see similar policies in place today, coupled with unprecedented monetary intervention that isn’t likely to abate anytime soon, especially in the face of a still-stagnant economy. And our national balance sheet is in worse shape. Are the mistakes that led to stagflation in the 1970s being repeated? Unfortunately, it appears so.
stocks and inflation (part 2 of 2)

stocks: inflation hedge or vedge?
I looked back at a period of time where inflation was low, rose to quite elevated levels, and fell back again to low average levels. In other words, a period containing three "regimes": before inflation reared its ugly head, during high inflation, and back again to more stable, predictable levels. I chose the twenty-five year period from 1964 through year-end 1988 because it nicely exhibits these characteristics.

The chart to the left shows inflation (consumer price index) in red, the S&P 500 total return in green and the real return (total return minus inflation) in purple. Each is indexed to 100 at 1/1/1964. Clearly, stocks (green) did not keep up with inflation over this time period while the real return on the market over was negative. That’s a pretty poor showing over a period when inflation boosted the consumer price level to almost 4 times its starting point. If stocks were a good inflation hedge we’d expect the green line to be persistently higher than the red, and meaningfully higher at 12/31/1988 if real returns were positive. However, this does not seem to have been the case.
Why were stocks such a poor inflation hedge over this period? The answer lies in valuation. Using Shiller’s cyclically-adjusted PE ratio, which I’ve cited often, the S&P 500 traded at 21.6 times earnings in 1964. By year-end 1988, they were just 14.7, a P/E decline of 32%. The chart below shows the inverse relationship between inflation (red) and stock valuations (cyclically-adjusted PE, green). Over this time period, the correlation between the two was negative 0.956, representing an almost perfect inverse correlation. High inflation proved to be an enemy when stock valuations started high.
Why is inflation so hostile for stock valuations? It comes down to interest rates; nominal interest rates must include compensation for inflation plus a real return component. Investors ultimately compare this rate against the "coupon" available on stocks - that is, corporate returns on equity (ROE). Since ROE does not tend to fluctuate much over long periods and is more likely to fall than rise during high inflation, the yield available on stocks can only change if their prices move lower (coupon "yield" relative to book value moves higher). Maturities are also compared – bonds have a definite maturity while a stock’s maturity is infinite. I’ll defer to Warren Buffett for further clarification: “Because of the additional risk, the natural reaction of investors is to expect an equity return that is comfortably above the bond return – and 12 percent return on equity versus, say, 10 percent return on bonds issued by the same corporate universe does not seem to qualify as comfortable. As the spread narrows, equity investors start looking for the exits.” Historical stock returns are likely to have looked much different if starting valuations were much lower than the 22 PE we see in the above illustrations. Because of these elevated levels, inflation had a demonstrably large impact on longer-term returns. While starting valuations always matter for subsequent returns, they seem to matter even more during high inflation.
Could this happen again? Well, today the cyclically-adjusted PE ratio is 23.7, so valuations are even higher than where these charts begin (1964). Even if you believe the Fed has everything under control and we won’t see high inflation anytime soon, it’s worthwhile to consider the aforementioned data when allocating your portfolio. The importance of stable prices is most noticeable when they go missing.
market bottom: feliz cumpleanos
earnings guidance not as extensive
press reaction to the Buffett letter
Buffett letter out today
the 21st century education
a couple quotes
A couple recent quotes that speak volumes.
Michael Pettis, in this week’s research note, on the economics of China’s growth :
“Not only do I believe that the combination of very low cost of capital, socialized credit risks, and strong short-term political incentives to fund massive projects always leads to capital misallocation, but I also believe that the explosion in [Non-Performing Loans] a decade ago, and the fact that total [State Owned Enterprise] profits are just a fraction of the interest rate subsidy they receive, is strong evidence that misallocated capital has long been a serious problem in China.”
Jeffrey Gundlach, on high-yield bonds (Barron's):
“The current 300 basis-point, or three percentage-point, spread between yields in the high-yield market and on 20-year (Treasury) bonds is as narrow as it has been at any time in the latest credit cycle.”
friday afternoon filing fun
On February 14, 2011, the Compensation Committee (the “Committee”) of the Board of Directors of WellCare Health Plans, Inc. (the “Company”) determined bonuses under the Company’s annual cash bonus plan for 2010 of $1,015,625 for Alec Cunningham, the Company’s Chief Executive Officer; $546,250 for Thomas L. Tran, the Company’s Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer; and $320,000 for Scott D. Law, the Company’s Senior Vice President, Health Care Delivery. These bonuses are expected to be paid on March 4, 2011.
The Committee also approved increases to base salary for Mr. Cunningham from $650,000 to $800,000 (note: +23%) and for Mr. Tran from$475,000 to $500,000, each effective as of February 13, 2011. For 2011, Mr. Cunningham’s short-term and long-term incentive targets will remain as 125% and 300%, respectively, but will be applied to his new annual base salary. Mr. Tran’s short-term and long-term incentive targets will remain as 100% and 150%, respectively, but will be applied to his new annual base salary.
a few words about inflation
The basket of goods and services consumed is different for everyone, so inflation is experienced uniquely by all. The person who lives in a lower-cost area and drives into a high-cost one for work might have above-average transportation expenses but below-average housing costs. The retiree might spend less on housing but much more on medical care. College students spend a lot on education.
Here is the “basket” used to compute the Consumer Price Index (CPI):

I see glaring differences between what I personally spend on many of these categories, and I suspect a lot of the population would, too. The CPI is used “adjust incomes, lease payments, retirement benefits, food stamp and school lunch benefits, alimony, and tax brackets.” But the government is keeping the books. So what’s the incentive here? It goes without saying that they stand to benefit most by keeping it as low as possible.
The current commodity environment is undoubtedly inflationary. The rising prices of base metals, food inputs, cotton prices, among others, don’t just affect electronics, food and apparel costs but ripple into other areas as well. The longer high prices persist the more they have the potential to permanently raise structural costs (including wages). It may be a while before these increases show up in the official statistics, though, as the most recent 1.6% year-over-year print indicates. Nonetheless, these increases can profoundly affect consumers without a commensurate increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Below are year-over-year prices changes (through yesterday) on several basic commodities. Not a pretty picture if these prices are sustained for a length of time. Even grease is up almost 80%. Grease!

complacency built, and building
Yesterday, the NYSE saw 365 new 52-week highs and just 9 new lows.
How much longer can this relentless, low volatility run continue? Since the end of September, we have seen only six days where the market has declined by 1% or more (just two of those this year). And the last time the market declined 2% or more was on August 11th -- and it's happened only twice since the end of June last year! That's a long time to go without substantial downside volatility.
Now, it's one thing to see the market climbing but we must consider its context. To do that we juxtapose this against prevailing valuations. On that front, it’s not encouraging. The S&P 500 stands at 18.5x earnings (over 24 cyclically adjusted) and is discounting decade-ahead per annum returns under 5% (1.8% of which is from dividends). Sure, interest rates are low which means stock *should be* worth more, but I don't buy it because investors can revise their return expectations relatively easily (and quickly).
So volatility is low and valuations are elevated, but the market keeps going up?
"It feels safer."
"There is money to be made."
Low volatility to the investor, to borrow from N.N. Taleb, is like the farmer feeding the soon-to-be-Thanksgiving-dinner turkey. Just as the safety appears greatest (based on backward-looking data), the danger is actually at its highest.
private market froth-iness
commodities running a marathon or sprint?
Commodities have been on a spectacular run since August. The Wall Street Journal’s front page story this morning specifically addresses agricultural commodities, including wheat, soybeans and corn. Along with precious metals, agriculture has led commodities’ price rise and helped incite continued inflows into these markets over the past several years. Traders cite on the ground reasons that prices have gone up so far so fast – including increasing consumption from China, multi-decade low reserves and higher corn ethanol production. Also, backwardation (future prices less than spot prices) in one-third of the GSCI commodities boosts the case for tight supply/demand conditions. But these supply/demand theses are valid regardless of price. (As with all non-income generating “assets,” pricing is an elusive exercise.)
Regardless of the specifically-cited reasons today, what I question is whether this is a modern incarnation of Gresham’s law, bad money driving out good. A hundred years ago, on a bi-metallic standard in countries that accepted other countries’ currencies as legal tender, the most “fine” or pure currency would be hoarded and the less pure (“bad” money) would be spent. Thus, as the debased money was used to buy the stronger currency, its relative price decreased and became even less valuable. The market saw to it that the worse currency was worth the least and the “good” money fell from circulation. Of course, this generally occurred in a system of fixed exchange rates and (mostly) convertible currencies. Today’s free-floating currencies are a relatively new development in monetary history.
Today, it looks like (“good”) physical assets are driving out (“bad”) fiat currency. Stated in terms of the dollar (because that’s how we measure them), commodities are clearly on the rise. Gold, silver, and copper, which as recently as a hundred years ago were used as a medium of exchange, were up 29%, 82% and 30%, respectively. Cotton and coffee gained 92% and 77%. As Standard & Poor’s observes, “2010 year can be broken down into two distinct periods – one extending from January through August and another covering the remainder of the year. The announcement of quantitative easing from the U.S. Federal Reserve has helped provide a bid for most commodities.” On one hand, it looks to me like the market is saying that fiat currencies are less valuable and/or are being debased. Or, we could have a speculative almost-bubble on our hands.
Bolstering the case for the latter is that ten years ago about $6 billion was invested in commodities. Today, it’s nearly $300 billion. Money flows tend to drive prices higher, all things equal, and it appears to be the same today. And where the money is flowing isn’t necessarily in the right direction. This Businessweek article elucidates some good points about commodity exposure. As someone smarter than me said, there is no asset class that enough money can’t spoil.
Whether these price increases are well-founded or not is open to debate, but there is a clear correlation between the announcement of “QE2” and the snapback in financial markets, including equities (correlation of commodities with stocks is near all-time highs). But not all commodities are moving higher – one that has bucked the trend is natural gas, which is abundant and experiencing low demand. Its price fell 40% last year. If the behavior Gresham discussed was occurring, we shouldn't expect its price to languish for long.
Still, we can't ignore the "hot money" going into commodities. For these, Wal-Mart may have said it best: "Watch for falling prices." What the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in the end.
predicting economic data points
This offers a case in point on why it’s best to ignore prognosticators, especially on metrics like jobs. These numbers may move one way or another, but there is no point in trying to trade on such information because we can’t know beforehand. Forecasters tend to be within a tight range of each other, so when there are big numbers they are just as surprised as the markets might be.
Of the 103,000 jobs created (statistically, at a 90% level of confidence) this month, 113,000 of them were private. About half the decline in the rate was due to folks leaving the labor force, the other half was actually increases in payrolls. Service-providing industries were by far the largest area that saw job creation, up 115,000. We can quibble over 10 or 20 basis point down tick in the headline number, but 16.7% is the number on which to focus. This is the so-called U-6, and it represents unemployed but also those who are working part time but want full-time work. Thus, it’s more comprehensive.
To get back to the point: it’s mostly pointless to focus on predictions, which tend to introduce noise into an investment process. Remember this the next time economic data is close to release and the media fills time with speculation.